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Of Elephants and Embryos:
A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood
JESSICA BERG*
It is not true .. that the legal order necessarily corresponds to the
natural order...; it is a policy determination whether legal personality
should attach and not a question of biological or 'natural'
correspondence.'
INTRODUCTION
What is a person? What responsibilities or obligations do we have to
entities that we recognize as persons under the law? These are not simply
theoretical questions. Louisiana recently became the first state to
statutorily designate ex utero embryos as "juridical persons," with rights
to sue and liability to being sued The battle over stem cell' legislation is
at base a battle over whether the embryos destroyed to harvest cells
should be considered persons.4 The international "Great Ape Project"
seeks to imbue non-human primates with attributes of legal
personhood-specifically "protections of the right to life, the freedom
from arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and protection from torture."5 The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is pushing the
limits of human-machine interfaces in an attempt to create better
* Professor of Law and Bioethics, Case Western Reserve University Schools of Law and
Medicine. B.A., Cornell University, i99o; J.D., 1994, Cornell University. I would like to thank Melvyn
Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, Kathy Hessler, Jessie Hill, Sharona Hoffman, Insoo Hyun, Stephen
Latham, Max Mehlman, Andrew Morriss, and Dale Nance for providing valuable comments on earlier
drafts; and Wednesday Forest and Loren Sonkin for their research assistance. All errors and omissions
are, of course, my own.
i. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972).
2. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121, 123 (999).
3. See, e.g., Evan Y. Snyder & Jeanne F. Loring, Beyond Fraud-Stem-Cell Research Continues,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321, 321-24 (2oo6) (describing the generation of stem cells after somatic-cell
nuclear transfer and the discovery that a prominent stem cell scientist had fabricated much of his
research in this area).
4. President Bush seems to have taken the stance that embryos are moral persons, and thus
entitled to legal protections. See Dana Bash & Deirdre Walsh, Bush Vetoes Embryonic Stem-Cell Bill,
CNN.coM, Sept. 25, 20o6, http://www.cnn.com/20o6POLITICS/o7/i9/stemcells.veto/index.html.
5. See GAP: Great Ape Project, The Great Ape Project: An Idea, A Book, An Organization,
http://www.greatapeproject.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
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persons, or even replacement "persons" that can perform jobs in lieu of
human beings.6 One might easily imagine the creation or discovery, in the
near future, of an entity that is of equal moral status with human beings,
but not genetically human.7 Far from being mere science fiction,
questions of legal personhood have already faced courts and legislatures
and are likely to become more relevant as technology advances.
Although many philosophers have struggled with the concept of
moral personhood, legal personhood has largely been ignored outside of
the corporate context. Yet as the issues raised above indicate, there is a
pressing need to answer the question of what constitutes a person. While
this Article deals indirectly with questions about moral status, its focus is
on legal status and the ways in which the law should recognize rights and
interests of certain entities.' In Part I of this Article, I argue that two
bases for according legal personhood status (either natural or juridical)
exist, and that distinct rights and protections flow from each status. The
first basis rests on the interests of the entity in question. The second basis
rests on the interests of currently recognized human persons. In both
cases, the rights and protections that follow from legal personhood status
should be limited by the justification for granting the status in the first
place. In Part II, I apply and consider the implications of the proposed
framework to various entities including embryos and fetuses, non-human
animals, and machines with artificial intelligence. Part III offers a brief
conclusion. The result of the analysis provided should be three-fold: a
richer understanding of legal personhood as currently applied (e.g., to
human beings and to corporations), the development of a framework for
evaluating the personhood status of novel or not currently recognized
entities, and a better theoretical reconciliation of some apparently
inconsistent laws regarding persons.9
I. THE LAW OF PERSONS
Before discussing categories of legal personhood, it is worth
considering whether there is such a thing as "personhood" law in the first
6. See generally DARPA Office Programs, http://www.darpa.millbody/off-programs.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2007) (listing DARPA projects).
7. Consider machines with artificial intelligence or extraterrestrials (E.T.): should E.T. or
artificially created persons be considered legal persons? See generally Robert A. Freitas, Jr., The Legal
Rights of Extraterrestrials, 97 ANALOG SCIENCE FICTION/ScIENCE FACT 54, 67 (1977) (noting that an
extraterrestrial would not have the status of personhood and would have no legal rights but that
Congress could decide to create a new legal classification-the "pseudo-person" -which grants the
E.T. a measure of rights and responsibilities).
8. I will adopt an interest theory of rights in this Article, rather than competing "choice" or
"will" theories. See generally THEORIES OF RIGHTS 9 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
9. See generally William E. Buelow, Comment, To Be and Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law
Regarding the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 963 (1998); Murphy S. Klasing, The
Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and
Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933 (I995).
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place.'" It could be that there are simply a number of different areas of
law that define persons in different ways depending on the purpose of
the law, but no cohesive "law of persons." The argument for this view
may be similar to ones that have taken issue with new categorizations of
specialty areas of law, such as Internet law. These arguments maintain
that the issues arising out of technological developments break down into
basic legal areas such as contract, tort, or criminal law, and there is no
unifying theme that justifies a special label." It is certainly true that there
is no express definition of "person" in the Constitution, nor has the
Supreme Court proffered one." Moreover, different state and federal
statutes define "person" differently, depending on their goal.'3 Focusing
so. See, e.g., Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2001) (stating that "although no coherent body of doctrine or
jurisprudential theory exists regarding [the legal metaphor "person"], a set of rhetorical practices has
developed around it"). But see Jane English, Abortion and the Concept of a Person, 5 CAN. J. PHIL.
233, 233 0975) (pointing out that there is no clear agreement regarding the concept of "person").
II. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 50, 502 (1999) (arguing that there may be no specialized law of the Internet, there is something
to be learned by examining the legal regulation of cyberspace).
12. See, e.g., Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 199
(1996) (arguing that although "the notion of a 'constitutional person' is uncertain," that "[a]ll persons
certainly have ... a minimum bundle of constitutional rights, which can never be suppressed without
challenging the person's very dignity and existence," and that "no U.S. case law exists on the
equivalent of the hard nucleus" but claiming "it would include the right to due process, the right to
own property, the right to bodily integrity, the right to live, and the right not to be owned"); Kathleen
Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C.
DAVis L. REV. 193 (1997). Although there may well be a core of rights of persons, I will not analyze
whether Ducor's list is correct. Furthermore, Ducor takes the position that "everything short of a
person will be considered an object"-a framework I clearly reject because I argue that embryos can
be considered both subjects and objects of rights. Ducor, supra, at 2o0. However, since Ducor makes
clear he is coming from a continental/civil law perspective it is possible that our disagreements stem
from our familiarity with, and embedding in, different legal systems. Moreover, he explicitly
"categorizes the embryo or fetus in the womb with other body parts before their separation from the
person." Id. at 206. He rejects the notion of giving embryos outside the womb interim status and holds
they are objects. Id. at 2 11. Living fetuses are to be considered subjects while they survive outside the
womb (as are viable fetuses after delivery-e.g., babies). Id. at 212.
13. See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357 (1986)
(discussing history of treatment of fetus and embryos as persons or property under various areas of
law). For example, the Bankruptcy Act includes individuals, partnerships, and corporations, but not
governmental units, as persons. See it U.S.C. § 101(30) (2000). Under Ohio's corporate laws, which
are typical, "person" is defined to include, "without limitation, a natural person, a corporation,
whether nonprofit or for profit, a partnership, a limited liability company, an unincorporated society
or association, and two or more persons having a joint or common interest." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 170I.oi(G) (West 1994). Foreign governments are "persons" with the right to sue for treble damages
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 55o F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1976), affd
434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978). Municipalities and other governmental units are "persons" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Cook County, Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 122 (2003); Monell v. Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 69o (1978). An unborn child is a "person" for purposes of tort (wrongful death)
and criminal law (feticide/Crimes Against Unborn Children Acts) in many states. See Michael
Holzapfel, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, i8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 431 (2002) (summary of state law). Eighteen states follow a "born alive"
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our attention on a personhood law as a whole, however, is a useful
endeavor. It is likely to lead to greater clarity in a variety of areas of law
(e.g., corporate law, animal law), as well as provide a framework under
which we can consider the application of current laws to new
developments, such as artificial intelligence.'4 As a result, conducting an
in-depth evaluation of legal personhood is both necessary and useful.
Even if there is a coherent law of personhood, why focus on that as
opposed to merely evaluating the issue in terms of legal rights, without
the "personhood" label, or with a new "pseudo-person" label?'" First,
our current system of laws is set up to focus exclusively on the rights of
persons and not of other entities. 6 Persons have rights, duties, and
obligations; things do not.'7 Although there have been challenges to this
binary framework, 8 thus far the United States legal system has
maintained the distinction. As a result, creating new legal categories to
address the rights of entities along a moral continuum would entail great
educational and other costs.'9 Second, as will be made clear by the
arguments below, currently existing personhood categorizations are
flexible enough to accommodate a variety of different levels of rights,
and thus there is little need to create a new category of rights holders.
A. LEGAL CATEGORIES
There are two legal categories of persons: natural and juridical.
rule of recovery for prenatal injuries. Id. at 451. Other states apply a viability standard at the time of
injury. See Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of Current
State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1845,
1851 (2000); see also Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194, 196 (N.M. i995) (analyzing state wrongful death
cases). In the context of employment law, employers covered by civil rights law include any "natural"
or "juridical" persons employing persons in return for any kind of compensation, for profit or
nonprofit purposes, as well as their agents and supervisors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Local
governments, municipal corporations, and school boards are "persons" subject to liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes civil liability on any person who deprives another of his federally
protected rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 683.
14. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV.
135 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1333, 1336 (2000) (suggesting that animals have rights, regardless of whether they have standing,
and also that they should be given standing, even though they are not persons).
16. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 75-76 (Walter Wheeler
Cook ed., 1923) (stating that all rights of persons are against other persons, and that there is no such
thing as a right against a thing).
17. Id.
18. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1336.
9. See, e.g., David Schmahmann & Lori Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C.
ENV-rL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 760 (1995) (pointing out that animal rights "must mean reposing in the
government a wholly new and undefined set of powers, presumably to be exercised on behalf of an
entirely new and vague constituency" and further questioning "[wihat sort of fearsome bureaucracy
would purport to institutionalize, standardize, and write regulations pertaining to animals' rights and
interests implicated by all legislation").
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"Natural person" is the term used to refer to human beings' legal status.
Certain legal rights adhere automatically upon birth, and the designation
of "natural person" may be taken as shorthand for identifying entities
that are entitled to the maximum protection under the law. Nonetheless,
not all natural persons have the same legal rights-children, for example,
are afforded fewer legal rights than adults. Additionally, the wording of
the Constitution suggests that the Framers were careful in their choice of
terms and recognized different rights of different types of natural
persons. Thus Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution distinguishes between the rights of "persons" and the rights
of "citizens."2 Likewise, the Supreme Court's determination in Roe v.
Wade that fetuses are not persons under the Fourteenth Amendment2'
did not answer the question of whether or not they should be considered
persons with respect to other areas of law. Thus states have sometimes
considered fetuses persons under tort or criminal statutes.22 In fact,
should the Court overturn Roe, it is not likely to decide that fetuses are
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather will leave the
issue up to the states. 3 So the law already appears to recognize different
types of persons.
In contrast to "natural person," the designation "juridical person"24
is used to refer to an entity that is not a human being, but for which
society chooses to afford some of the same legal protections and rights as
accorded natural persons. Corporations are the best example of this
category, but juridical persons may also include other entities. 5
20. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.") (emphasis added). Thus, there appear to be certain fundamental rights of all persons, although
citizens may have additional protections compared to non-citizens (as do residents versus non-
residents of a particular state).
21. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Holzapfel, supra note 13.
23. The Court is understandably wary of recognizing new constitutional rights. Thus, for example,
in the recent physician-assisted suicide cases the Court found that there was no federal constitutional
right at stake, and thus states would have to decide whether or not to create a state constitutional or
statutory right. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (997); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 705-o6 (1997).
24. Juridical persons are also referred to as "artificial," "juristic," and "fictitious/fictional"
persons. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 58, 636 (1819) ("corporation is
an artificial being"); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 563-65 (1987) (referring to corporations as fictional persons).
25. See, e.g., I U.S.C. § 1 (2ooo) (stating that the word "person" in any Act of Congress includes,
unless the context indicates otherwise, "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals"); see also N.C. G.S. § 12-3(6) (1986)
(defining "person" to include political bodies and corporations).
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Both designations, "natural" and "juridical," signify legal
personhood as opposed to moral personhood. But the terms also signal
two important distinctions. The first is that an entity labeled a natural
person is genetically human. The differentiation between genetically
human persons and other persons may become more important as
additional entities lay claim to the latter categorization. Juridical persons
may be genetically human, but there are no non-human natural persons.
Second, natural persons are entitled to priority over juridical persons in a
hierarchy of rights. This is not to say that juridical persons might not be
granted equal rights with natural persons, but that such allocation of
rights would have to be justified by the interests involved. In other
words, natural persons function as the baseline against which other rights
allocations are judged. Our society was developed by and for natural
persons, and thus legal rights focus on this group.
B. NATURAL PERSONS
Currently the legal category of natural persons is limited to human
beings once they are born.27 Because rights entail corresponding
obligations on the part of other rights-holders to respect those rights,
recognizing another entity as a natural person would necessarily limit the
rights of currently recognized natural persons." In some cases the rights
at issue may even be diminished if additional entities share the rights.
Voting is one example. If more entities are given the right to vote, the
value of any previously recognized person's right to vote is weakened,
from a quantitative perspective. 9 Because of this effect, there must be
some basis for according legal personhood status to new entities that
justifies the potential diminution of rights for current status holders. Such
limitation could be justified either by the interests of the entity itself, or
by the interests of currently recognized natural persons in protecting
their rights. That is to say, it could be that in order to protect the rights of
currently recognized persons, the new entity must also be afforded the
same rights as persons. To continue with the voting example from above,
the extension of the right to vote to entities that should have a voice in
an election may be necessary to achieve a legitimate outcome, and thus
26. I do not intend to take issue with this assertion, although one could certainly argue that the
preference for natural persons is an artifact of their power at the time we initially created legal
protection (had there been non-human persons in power at that time, those other entities may well
have had priority in a rights hierarchy). This is an argument for another piece, and thus I start my
evaluation of legal personhood from the initial premise that natural persons are entitled to priority.
27. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1972).
28. Ronald Green, Toward a Full Theory of Moral Status, AM. J. BIOETHics, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at
44-45 (2005) (noting that "[blestowals of status reflect what moral agents allow each other to do with
the entities in question, or what is the same thing, what limitations agents are willing to impose with
respect to such entities on each other's liberty of action").
29. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 113-14 (993).
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function to protect the rights of currently recognized voters. Another
way to put this is to say that even though the addition of new voters
diminishes the value of any one person's vote quantitatively, it increases
its value qualitatively, by strengthening the validity of the entire process.
So the shorthand "interests of currently recognized persons" includes
both the interests of currently recognized persons individually, and
aggregate (and broader) "societal interests," such as according rights
fairly. I will develop this idea in later sections examining the interests of
others. The following two subsections focus on exploring the two bases in
the context of natural personhood
i. Interests of the Entity in Question
A full analysis of the philosophical debate regarding moral status or
moral personhood is beyond the scope of this Article.3" For our purposes,
it is important only to recognize that there are a number of different
factors that have been proposed as a basis for according moral status.'
Characteristics that have been used, either singly or in combination,
include: biological life, genetic humanness, brain development, ability to
feel pain, consciousness/sentience, ability to communicate, ability to form
relationships, higher reasoning ability, and rationality.32  Bonnie
Steinbock and Mary Anne Warren both provide excellent reviews of the
different proposals, each pointing out the limitations of the varying
approaches for determining either moral status, or moral personhood.33
30. Some authors talk about moral status and some talk specifically about (moral) personhood.
The term "person" when used in a moral context is not necessarily coterminous with "human being."
See, e.g., H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS iO4 (1986) ("Persons, not
humans, are special."). Engelhardt goes on to argue that persons have higher moral standing than
other living creatures, including human embryos and fetuses. Id. at ito. His test for personhood
revolves around membership in a moral community and specifically "capacity to be self-conscious,
rational, and concerned with worthiness and blame and praise." Id. at 1o7. He also notes that non-
humans can be persons, such as extraterrestrials. Id. Other commentators have argued that certain
higher reasoning animals should be considered moral persons. Whether these entities are entitled to
legal status is an issue I will touch on below. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. See English, supra note io, at 234-35 (noting that no single criterion can capture the concept
of a person but that a "'person' is a cluster of features, of which rationality, having a self-concept and
being conceived of humans are only part"). Interestingly, English goes on to point out that "a fetus lies
in the penumbra region where our concept of a person is not so simple. For this reason I think a
conclusive answer to the question of whether a fetus is a person is unattainable." Id. See generally
EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (Peter Singer et al. eds., 199o). For a
bibliography of different moral personhood arguments see James Park, Personhood Bibliography,
http://www.tc.umn.edu/-parkxo32/B-PERSON.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
32. See, e.g., Park, supra note 31. Whether or not one can determine moral status solely on
evaluation of characteristics is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally George Khushf, Owning
up to Our Agendas: On the Role and Limits of Science in Debates About Embryos and Brain Death, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 58, 59 (2006) (arguing that science will not answer the questions about the moral
status of embryos).
33. See generally BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF
EMBRYOS AND FETUSES (1992) (listing and analyzing the different arguments); MARY ANNE WARREN,
MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER LIVING THINGS (1997).
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Their work will not be repeated here.
According to the prominent legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, an
entity must have interests to have moral status.34 Steinbock adds that
"interests" is a term of art which refers to the capacity of an entity to
have a stake in things, and this capacity is contingent on the entity being
sentient, or consciously aware.35 "Interests" in this sense refers to an
entity having "a sake or welfare of its own" and "the expression ... is
intended to emphasize the stake that conscious, sentient beings have in
their own well-being. ' '36 One need not agree with Feinberg or Steinbock
about whether "interests" are necessary for moral status to acknowledge
the role they play in legal personhood designations.37 If an entity does not
have interests in the sense identified above, then legal personhood
cannot be based on the protection of those interests. In other words, we
cannot claim that an entity without interests has a claim to legal
personhood for its own sake, or because it has interests that must be
protected." Instead, a determination of legal personhood must be based
on the protection of the interests of others.39 Legal personhood based on
the interests of others may be more limited than legal personhood based
on the interests of the entity itself. I will return to this point in more
detail in subsections below.
Interests likely develop over a continuum, as the entity develops,
rather than appear as a single-point-in-time event. How legal
personhood should track this development is a different question. One
might designate a single point in time for granting legal personhood
protections, even though the entity has not fully developed all the
characteristics in question.4' This is essentially what the Supreme Court
did in Roe when it stated that the constitutional protections of the
34. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 34 (1984).
35. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 40-41. Identifying the exact point at which moral personhood
applies to a developing human may be important, but is not necessary for the arguments made in this
Article. An entity may or may not meet the criteria for moral personhood, but that does not answer
the question of whether legal personhood rights should be recognized.
36. Id. at 18, 20.
37. Steinbock spends quite a bit of time in her book discussing the implications of the "interests"
approach as well as different uses of the word "interests." Id. at 14-41. I will not repeat those
arguments here, but will accept the use of the term as defined by her.
38. 1 am considering whether to apply legal personhood status in the first place, not how to
evaluate whether that status has been lost or how it should be handled for individuals who were
previously identified as natural persons but have currently lost the ability to form interests.
39. The interests of others can include an interest related to an entity without interests. That is to
say, I might have an interest in something happening to my car (which itself does not have interests).
Likewise, assuming without argument that plants do not have interests, I might have an interest in
preventing the death of my plants.
40. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that state interests in protecting
potential human life become stronger as a pregnancy progresses. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833,869 (1992).
41. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 85.
[Vo1. 59:369
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Fourteenth Amendment apply at birth.42 But the lack of constitutional
protections prior to that point does not determine whether other legal
protections apply. For example, using birth as the single-point-in-time
event for granting human beings any legal rights may create problems
because it fails to recognize the significant personhood interests of late-
term fetuses. The approach of jurisdictions that allow tort and criminal
prosecutions for injury to in utero fetuses indicates that birth is not
always the line at which any and all legal rights start.43 I will return to this
issue later in Part II.A. For now, it is sufficient to reiterate that legal
personhood based on an entity's interests is not possible until the entity
has actually developed interests. Prior to that development, legal
personhood must be based on concerns about protecting the interests of
others.
2. Interests of Others
Natural personhood status need not depend solely on the interests of
the entity in question. We consider all human beings, once born, to be
natural persons, regardless of whether they actually have interests.
Anencephalic infants, for example, are born without a brain cortex and
thus completely without any cognitive ability;' they cannot, by
Feinberg's definition, have interests.45 Nonetheless we still treat them as
natural persons. 46 The American Medical Association's (AMA) opinion
in 1994 that, while still living, these infants be considered appropriate
organ donors was met with considerable resistance-prompting the
AMA to reverse its recommendation and issue an opinion reverting to its
1992 standard, which asserted that anencephalic infants be treated as
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1972).
43. See, e.g., Note, supra note Io, at 1763-64 (describing the conflict between different notions of
personhood inherent in abortion and feticide laws). It may be that the application of tort and criminal
law to actions involving fetuses are based on concerns about other's rights and are not tied to whether
the fetus is a person under the law. Lawrence C. Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the
Concept, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 348-50 (1975) (noting that "[a] duty not to kill ... may be justified
by reference to the consequence for the agent or society" rather than "reference to the victim's ability
and title to lay claim to the duty"). It is also possible that the jurisdictions that have such apparently
conflicting statutes are in error and one or the other approaches should be reconsidered.
44. Taber's medical dictionary defines "anencephalus" as a "[clongenital absence of brain and
cranial vault, with the cerebral hemispheres completely missing or reduced to small masses." TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY tOO (7th ed. 1993). Interestingly it goes on to state that the
condition "is incompatible with life." Id. In fact, anencephalic infants may survive for some short
period after birth, if the brain stem is present and with a variety of technological interventions.
Cognition, however, remains impossible. Nor do such infants feel pain. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
45. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 30-36.
46. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Nelson & Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral Disagreement:
The President's Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human Embryos, AM. J. BIoETHics, Nov.-Dec.
2005, at 33, 35 (2005) (providing a general theory of moral status that gives born human beings the
same moral status as moral agents, even if they lack moral agency).
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other natural persons are for purposes of transplantation.47 Since
anencephalic infants lack interests under the model suggested above, the
basis for the natural personhood status would have to be the protection
of the interests of other currently recognized persons. The interests here
are broader than simply the interests of the anencelphalic infant's
parents, although their interests play a role. There is general societal
value in granting full legal personhood protections to all human beings at
least at birth, regardless of the interests of the entity in question.4" While
some infants may have failed to develop any relevant characteristics
because of impaired growth, making distinctions between neonates49 is
extremely difficult. Perhaps the complete absence of any cognitive
ability, such as is the case with anencelphalic infants, can function as a
bright line; but almost any other attempt at distinguishing based on
cognition will be impossible given the limited capacity of all newborns.0
As discussed above, society has thus far been unwilling to deny even
anencephalic infants the protections of personhood. Perhaps because all
human babies share the same external form and because there is a
societal interest in encouraging specific caring behaviors towards all
infants (and discouraging other behaviors such as infanticide), we include
even anencephalic infants in the category of natural persons."
47. See Faith Lagay, Considering Organ Donation by Anencephalic Neonates, VIRTUAL MENTOR,
Aug. 2004, http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/oo4/o8/codei-o4o8.html#io; see also AMA COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opinion 2.162, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, in CEJA
ANNOTATED OPINIONS I6 (1992); AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opinion 2.162,
Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, in CEJA CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 30 (994);
AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opinion 2.162, Anencephalic Infants as Organ
Donors, in CEJA CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 33 (1996); see also AMA Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1614
(1995).
48. Yet even as our legal system accepts that at birth humans are entitled to full legal protection,
it does not truly afford babies and even children equal status with competent adult human beings. Part
of the difficulty is certainly the need to have someone else articulate and promote the rights of
children since they are unable to do so for themselves. But another part of the lack of equal status is
the continued recognition of parent's property interests. Property interests attach at the initial
developmental stages of the embryo. They do not extinguish, but rather are progressively limited by
the development of personhood interests as the entity matures. For an interesting discussion of
parental rights relating to children (although not termed as property rights) see Harry Brighouse and
Adam Swift, Parents' Rights and the Value of the Family, 117 ETHICS 8o (2oo6).
49. Human infants are commonly referred to as neonates during the first six weeks of life after
birth.
50. Or, to put it another way, we have limited capacity to test newborns for cognitive ability.
51. Jane English concludes that some of the restrictions on late-term abortions or infanticide can
be justified not because the entity in question is a person, but because "[olur psychological
constitution makes it the case that for our ethical theory to work, it must prohibit certain treatment of
non-persons which are significantly person-like ... [lest we] undermine the system of sympathies and
attitudes that make the ethical system work." English, supra note to, at 241; see also PETER
CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE: MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICE I 15-16 (1992); CARSON STRONG, ETHICS
IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW FRAMEWORK 57-58 (1997) (discussing the external
form and similarity arguments); A.V. Townsent, Radical Vegetarians, 57 AUSTRALIAN J. PHIL. 85, 93
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This "form" argument is not simply about external appearances,
however. A doll that looks extremely lifelike would not be entitled to
personhood protections. The basis of the argument is the effect of the
designation (or lack thereof) on the rights of currently recognized
persons. The more similar an entity is to other entities that are
designated legal persons, the more likely we are to treat them the same.
Anencephalic infants are too much like other newborn babies to treat as
if they were not full legal persons. Likewise, while we may stop treatment
when someone is declared brain dead,52 we do not bury her while still
warm and breathing. A warm body is too much like a living person.53
Apart from anencephalic infants, who share all characteristics with
other newborns except presence of the brain cortex, and previously
recognized persons who are temporarily or permanently unable to form
interests (e.g., unconscious or incompetent individuals),54 there appear to
be no other situations where natural personhood rights are granted to an
entity that does not itself have interests. This is an important point.
Granting natural personhood status provides the entity in question the
highest level of rights and protections, and thus limits the rights of other
natural persons (since their rights are limited by the rights of the newly
recognized natural persons). Justifying such limitation on the protection
of the rights of existing persons seems counter-intuitive. Protection here
does not necessarily mean protection of any one individual's rights, but
protection of the concepts underlying the rights-that which makes the
right meaningful. In fact, it may be that the inclusion of anencephalic
infants in the category of natural persons using this reasoning is
mistaken. I will return again to this point in Part II.C.2, but full
exploration of this particular debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nonetheless, the analysis provided here may afford insight into a variety
of other contexts in which the rights and protections of legal personhood
are a matter of controversy. For our purposes, the crucial point is that
under the current legal framework, natural personhood status is only
appropriate where the entity in question is genetically human and either
the entity has interests of its own that justify the designation or, in rare
situations, protection of the interests of other natural persons justifies the
designation.
(1979).
52. Legal death, or brain death, is determined by the absence of brain function even though
artificial means may be in use to maintain heartbeat and respiration (traditionally death was
determined by the absence of heartbeat and breathing).
53. Interestingly, although newborn gorillas are also reminiscent of newborn humans we do not
afford them legal personhood protections. Perhaps their form is not close enough, or perhaps it is a
mistake not to afford them protections. I will talk about non-human animals in more detail in Part III.
54. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate how personhood status should be handled for
entities that have lost the ability to form interests. My focus here is on the initial assignment of
personhood status.
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C. JURIDICAL PERSONS
Unlike the designation of natural person, there appear to be few, if
any, legally established limitations either on what kind of entity can be
labeled a "juridical person," or what rights follow. An initial review of
the jurisprudence suggests that states have broad authority to designate
juridical persons55 and to define the extent of their powers under the
law. 6 Despite the lack of legal limitations, I suggest that the rights
accorded a particular juridical person should follow from the reason for
the designation, although in many of the legal cases there is little or no
discussion of this point. As a result, not all juridical persons will
necessarily have the same legal rights. The rationale for restricting
juridical persons' rights based on the justification for granting them arises
from the impact on existing persons' rights. As stated above, the
inclusion of any additional entities in the category of legal persons may
limit the rights of previously recognized persons: first because they now
have to respect the rights of the newly recognized persons, and second
because in some contexts the value of a pre-existing right may be
diminished. " If juridical personhood is necessary to protect the interests
55. It may not be true that a state could designate any entity a juridical person. Even if it could,
using the juridical person label for an entity without any justificatory basis as defined here, and thus
creating an entity with a label but no real rights, may undermine the use of the term in other contexts.
In other words, if a state can simply decide to call anything a "person," even something with no rights
at all, the label "person" carries less weight.
56. Many of the constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights have been held to apply to juridical
persons (usually corporations), including the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses with respect to property interests and First Amendment freedom of speech
protections. See First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (978). Corporations can
have privacy interests that protect them from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). Corporations are also afforded double
jeopardy protection, but not self-incrimination, under the Fifth Amendment. At least since 1886 in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Fourteenth Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the laws,
and that it entitles them to due process of law, at least since 1889 in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway
Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,
337 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1949), argued that the Equal Protection Clause, intended to remedy "gross
injustice and hardship" against the "newly emancipated negroes," applied only to human beings. It
was never intended to protect corporations "from oppression by the legislature." Id. at 578. On the
other hand, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not applicable to juridical persons, as are some
other "personal" rights. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); see also United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (holding that neither the Fourth or Fifth Amendments apply to
juridical persons). But see Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2003)
(holding that the False Claims Act applies to corporations because they are equally capable of
defrauding or exploiting the exercise of federal spending power). The state's powers to grant or
withhold rights to a juridical person, however, are not unlimited. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S.
65, 81 (1870) (noting that a corporation is limited by the terms of its charter). And states are not free
to enact laws that would arbitrarily favor individuals over corporations. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777
(1978); see also Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929).
57. Using the example from above, if a state gives corporations the right to vote in elections, it
would dilute the votes of natural persons. See DwovRIN, supra note 29.
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of the entity, the rights that follow should be those that actually protect
the interests at stake. Likewise, if juridical personhood is necessary to
protect the interests of others, the rights that follow should be those that
actually protect those interests, so as not to risk infringing on other rights.
Similarly, even the rights of natural persons are understandably limited
by the rights of other natural persons; the rights and interests of others
must be factored in. The sections below consider how the interests of the
entity and the interests of others function in the context of juridical
personhood.
i. Interests of the Entity
Unlike the debate about natural personhood, historically discussions
of juridical personhood rarely involved a discussion of the moral status of
the entity in question. Nonetheless, some commentators studying
corporate personality theory"8 have suggested that it would make more
sense to base juridical personhood on the interests of the entity in
question, thereby mirroring the debates about natural persons above. 9
One author states that personhood is appropriate when the entity in
question "behave[s] in those ways that, by and large, are explainable by
appeal to a coherent set of true empirical generalizations." He goes on
to assert that the generalizations cluster around the primary state of
intentionality, which is ascribed based on "observed outward
manifestations or behavioral evidence. '' 6 On this basis he claims that
corporations are moral persons.6' An expert in business ethics, Thomas
Donaldson, takes the argument a step further and states that if
corporations are moral persons, then they also should have the rights
that natural persons have.6' He then considers and rejects the notion that
58. In drawing from the literature on corporate personality theory I do not mean to imply that
embryos are like corporations, but merely that it is useful to examine previously developed legal
theory regarding juridical persons.
59. For example, Alexander Nekam states that any entity, real or imagined, can be recognized
under law as a subject of rights, regardless of its characteristics, so long as it is "looked upon by the
community as a unit having interests which need and deserve social protection." ALEXANDER NEKAM,
THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 26 (1938). Nekam distinguishes between
administrators and subjects of rights. He notes that "[w]hile every right needs an administrator and
such administrator can only be a human being not deprived of his will, the subject of the right, the
benficiary [sic] of legally protected interest, can be, on the contrary, anything which the community
regards as a unit having socially important interests needing and deserving juridic protection." Id. at
33; see aLso PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 (1984) (noting that some
commentators argue that "juridical person" is simply a label applied to all entities that are the subject
of rights).
6o. FRENCH, supra note 59, at 88.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 93. French does not want to distinguish moral persons as a subset of persons. Rather he
thinks that intentional agency is sufficient to be considered a person and thus a moral person. Id. He
would likely take issue with my distinctions between natural persons and juridical persons.
63. THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 18 (1982).
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corporations are moral persons.6' Instead he argues that corporations are
sometimes moral agents. 65 Still others find it problematic that we would
ever use the terminology of persons in the context of an entity that is not
a moral actor.66
Although moral corporate personality theory provides a natural
starting place for discussions of juridical personhood, there are two
problems with drawing directly from this literature to develop a broader
theory of legal personhood. The first is that most commentators focus
exclusively on corporate entities, leaving little room for a broader theory
of juridical persons that might be applied to non-associative entities. The
second is that the interests deemed important by the commentators for
moral agency and thus juridical personhood may not be found even in
entities we comfortably include in the category of natural persons (e.g.,
very young children or developmentally disabled adults). In fact, we have
little in the corporate personality literature that helps identify when it is
appropriate to use juridical personhood as a basis to protect the entity in
question. As a result, such analysis will have to be fleshed out in the
context of each specific entity under consideration, and more insight may
be gained in drawing from general moral philosophy, then specifically
from moral corporate theory. I suggest some initial steps in Part II.
2. Interests of Others
In contrast to the corporate personality theories discussed above,
most discussions about corporate personality develop the concept of
juridical personhood using the interests of already recognized natural
persons. There are two related arguments for according juridical
personhood based on the interests of others. First, categorization as a
juridical person may be necessary for practical reasons, since the law
requires an object upon which to act. In other words, currently
recognized natural persons may have an interest in identifying entities as
legal actors who can have rights or obligations, who can sue or be sued.
Alternatively, one might recognize entities as juridical persons (and give
them some of the same rights as natural persons) because the failure to
do so would undermine the rights of currently recognized natural
persons.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id. at 30 (noting that "embody[ing] a process of moral decision-making" requires "(i) The
capacity to use moral reasons in decision-making [and] (2) The capacity of the decision-making
process to control not only overt corporate acts, but also the structure of policies and rules").
Corporations that fail to meet these requirements should not be considered to be moral agents and
also "fail to qualify as a holder of rights or responsibilities." Id. at 32.
66. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON 88-95 (1992) (summarizing
debates about corporate personality and arguing that it is morally hazardous to separate moral
accountability from personhood designations and concluding that corporations should not be treated
as persons).
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The notion of practical necessity is drawn from early articulations of
corporate personality theory-fictional entity theory and real entity
theory-that were based not on suppositions about the moral character
of corporations, but on the need to create an entity to which the law
could apply. Fictional entity theory states that corporations are
completely creatures of law. 67  Real entity theory, by contrast,
acknowledges that there is an actual entity, which is termed the
"corporation." ' Both the fictional entity theory and the real entity
theory are compatible with broad discretion on the part of states in
determining what rights to accord. But although the theories function
descriptively, they provide no basis for understanding whether and when
a particular entity should be considered a juridical person. Moreover,
instead of articulating a basis," the judicial cases using the theories rely
on circular analysis, asserting that corporations have a particular legal
right because they are juridical persons.7' Explaining this lack of
normative reasoning, John Dewey asserted that the term "person" in law
might merely be "a synonym for a right-and-duty-bearing unit."72 The
67. See Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 17o N.E.
479, 482 (N.Y. 1930) (noting that the concession theory states that corporate personality is "invariably
the gift and creature of the state" and holding the law determines when the life (legal personality) of
an artificial person has been terminated, conditioned by the juristic quality of the cause for
termination); see also McCabe v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., I3 F. 827, 830 (N.D. Iowa 1882) (holding a
corporation is a citizen only in the state of its creation because it cannot exist away from the law which
created it); City of Baton Rouge v. Bernard, 840 So. 2d 4, 7 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
68. This theory is based upon the idea that "even in the absence of a charter or other token of the
will of government there are groups so natural and so spontaneous as to evoke legal recognition of a
corporate existence." Petrogradsky, I7o N.E. at 482. The legal recognition or lack of recognition of the
corporation does not extinguish its existence.
69. See Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 173 (1985) (pointing out that these theories functioned to set guidelines as corporate doctrine
developed, and arguing that they were both affected by social developments and, in turn, themselves
shaped historical development); see also David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the
Corporation, 199o DUKE L. J. 201, 204, 241-51 (discussing Horwitz's arguments).
70. See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGs L.J. 577, 620-51 (i9o) (discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to corporations and
arguing that the Court has put forth no coherent theory to justify its decisions).
71. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (suggesting that these questions of law regarding rights of corporations
would be better decided based on either empirical evidence or ethical argument, rather than recourse
to circular arguments of legal terminology).
72. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 656
(1926). Although it is true that to the extent we live in a society governed by law there may be no
practical distinction between those entities recognized as legal persons because they are natural
persons or those that are artificial persons-both are "legal" persons. But there may be fundamental
differences between the rights of entities that can claim moral status and the rights of entities that
cannot, regardless of official legal status. Moreover, while Dewey's point about historical artifacts of
corporate personality theory obfuscating debates about the law applied to associations is important,
the current question of whether legal personhood should be recognized for entities which meet none
of the characteristics of corporations and only one (genetics) with natural persons, should lead us to
reexamine the idea that the state can determine the whole of what it means to be a person under the
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law must have an object upon which to act and that object must be a
"person. 7 3 Thus, Dewey argued, the development of the term "corporate
personality" and the accompanying theories are a historical anomaly.74
Dewey may be correct in his analysis of the historical development of
corporate personality theory; I will take no stand on this debate. But
unlike corporations, the categories of embryos, fetuses, non-human
animals, and machines with artificial intelligence are clearly not
"fictional" entities. The potential application of juridical personhood to
these entities makes it necessary to reconsider the possibility of a
normative justification for juridical personhood based on social
interests.75 On the other hand, these new entities may not be actors
functioning in the legal or social marketplace, so there may be less basis
for categorizing them as juridical persons on this rationale alone.
An alternative possibility likewise draws on the interests of natural
persons, but not in terms of practical needs of the legal system. Steinbock
argues that the symbolic value of potential persons, while less important
than the moral value of actual persons, functions as a basis to afford
some protections to embryos and fetuses. 6 The term "symbolic value"
refers to the consideration of the interests of currently recognized
persons. However, there are many things that we might recognize as
having symbolic value, but to which we would not think to grant juridical
personhood. The American flag is one example. Moreover, the concept
of symbolic value is itself limited, since not only would it be
inappropriate to designate some things with symbolic value "juridical
persons," but some currently recognized juridical persons-
corporations-do not necessarily have symbolic value. So although the
notion of symbolic value is theoretically appealing, it is of limited use.
This is not to imply that embryos lack symbolic value, but the concept of
symbolism cannot (alone) form the basis for a framework of personhood
law.
73. Id. Hohfeld's system applied only to persons. See HOHFELD, supra note i6, at 74-75.
74. See Dewey, supra note 72, at 658 (discussing F.W. Maitland, The Corporation Sole, I6 L.Q.
REV. 335 (I9oo)). As a result, Dewey concludes that discussions of personhood should be divorced
from theoretical conceptions of natural or artificial personality. Id. at 669. Thus he would prefer not to
use the term "person" to characterize the debate. Id. at 662. I think, however, that given the common
use of the term in our language it serves as a good proxy for the underlying issues and brings with it an
already developed legal framework.
75. Frederick Hallis, writing from an English law perspective, points out that a legal theory of
corporate personality should take into account the real nature of the entities that will be considered
juridical persons, as well as pragmatic concerns about how the law will function. See FREDERICK
HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY xxxvii (i930). Hallis argues that there are three elements required to
be a juridical person: (I) "It must be an organized collectivity capable of acting as a whole in
furtherance of an interest which the law will protect"; (2) "it must have a directing idea, a definite
aim" that "controls its internal and external activities"; and (3) it must have "a social value by virtue of
pursuing an interest worthy of legal protection." Id. at 241-42.
76. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at I96-97.
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status and rights.
Rather than concentrate on the symbolism of a particular entity, I
would argue that one should consider broadly the effect on natural
persons of granting rights of juridical personhood. Recognition of rights
of juridical persons ultimately may benefit or harm the rights of natural
persons.' This is an empirical question and should be evaluated in a
particular context. Thus granting free speech rights to a particular
corporation may help or harm the rights of natural persons."8 But making
inquiries in each case may be too costly or time consuming. Instead of
adopting such an act-utilitarian approach,79 one might prefer a rule-
utilitarian approach that asks generally whether granting a particular
right to a juridical person benefits or harms the rights of natural
persons.s° Again, as with all utilitarian inquiries, this is an empirical issue,
and gathering data, particularly generalizable data, may be difficult.
Corporations are already observable in the marketplace, but we have no
means of gathering empirical information on the effect of granting or
withholding certain rights from embryos or fetuses or non-human
77. For example, the nexus of contracts theory justifies corporate personhood, and the resulting
rights that adhere, based on the freedom of contract rights of the natural persons who make up the
corporation. Thus the theory functions as a limit on state interference with corporations due to the
limits the state generally has in interfering with the freedom of natural persons to contract. In order to
enter into such a contract, a group of people "must organize, assume a name and choose from their
number trustees" to become an artificial person "with the general rights and powers, and subject to
the obligations and duties of a natural person, having power to exist, notwithstanding there be a
complete change in its membership." Miller v. Milligan, i88i Ohio Misc. LEXIS 12, at *8 (Ohio
Common Pleas). But see William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409-10 (1989) (arguing that the nexus of contracts concept is not
entirely accurate and suggesting a replacement model); David Graver, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal
Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNOTABLE 235, 239-40 (1999) (arguing that the
nexus of contracts theory "stretches unduly the notion of contracts" and "fails to account for the ways
corporations act in the world").
78. Graver notes that the courts have not been willing to examine the specific motivations of
corporations in the same way they've been reluctant to examine the motivations of natural persons
exercising constitutional rights. Graver, supra note 77, at 247. However, he argues that the situations
are different and we should "draw sharp distinctions among fictional bodies of various types of
organizations and accord each type of body constitutional rights based on the benefits or harms such
rights for such bodies will bestow on humans." Id.
79. Rule-utilitarianism seeks to effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest good
(e.g., a rule that physicians should keep patient confidences). Act-utilitarianism, on the other hand,
focuses on individual acts and in each case evaluates what action will lead to the greatest good (which
may or may not result in the physician maintaining confidentiality). See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 343-45 (5th ed. 2001). Richard Lippke provides an
example of this approach when he develops his theory of business ethics (and thus identifies the limits
that society should place on corporate actions) based on the extent to which things advance or restrict
individual autonomy. See generally RICHARD LIPPKE, RADICAL BUSINESS ETHICS (1995).
80. See, e.g., Tara Radin, 7o0 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619, 653 (2003) (suggesting that the courts chose not to extend constitutional
protections against double jeopardy and self-incrimination to corporations because the result would
have been unjust).
December 20071
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
animals.
In the absence of data, one might compare the characteristics of the
entity in question to natural persons and infer whether excluding a
particular protection would necessarily affect the rights of natural
persons, based on similarities between the entity and natural persons.
This is not a question about whether the Framers envisioned the entity in
question as a "person," but whether the concept of "person" would or
should encompass the entity given our current understanding of the
term.8' To the extent that an entity matches the relevant characteristics of
entities which have all the characteristics of persons-e.g., adult
competent human beings-that entity should be afforded personhood
protections because to do otherwise would both be inconsistent and
would undermine the rights sought to be upheld. Slavery is a good
example. Even though the Framers did not envision slaves with
constitutional rights (in fact many of the Framers themselves owned
slaves), the entities they did envision as protected shared all relevant
characteristics with slaves except skin color. The exclusion based on such
a nominal characteristic undermined the strong protections for which the
Constitution stands. In contrast to slaves," corporations are not human
beings and their exclusion from certain constitutional protections may
not undermine the precepts upon which the Constitution is based,
although this may have to be evaluated for each right in question.8"
D. SUMMARY
In sum, determinations of both natural and juridical personhood rest
on the evaluation of two issues: (i) interests of the entity, and (2)
interests of others. Concerns about protection of the interests of others
further breaks down into two issues. First, currently recognized natural
persons may have an interest in identifying entities as legal actors who
can have rights or obligations. The basis for this rationale is practical
need, and it is not sufficient for according natural personhood. Since the
goal is to protect the interests of currently recognized persons, the mere
need to recognize a legal actor is not enough to limit the rights of other
natural persons by including additional entities in the categorization.
81. This point is often confused. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 7o, at 657 ("A theory of original
intent provides no basis for extending rights to corporations because these entities are never
mentioned in the Constitution."). Mayer conflates original intent with textualism. Compare id., with
David Graver, supra note 77, at 243-44 (advocating a constitutional theory of personhood which he
calls "embodied consciousness" focusing on the Framers' intent, and highlighting "three elements:
interiority, exteriority, and autonomy").
82. The rights of slaves, of course, are linked to their own moral status as well as the implications
for other persons, whereas the rights of corporations are linked only to the interests of persons with
moral status.
83. For a list of constitutional rights that have been applied to corporations see Radin, supra note
8o, at 652.
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Second, one might recognize entities as legal persons because the failure
to do so would undermine the rights of currently recognized natural
persons. This rationale is strong enough to provide a basis for either
natural or juridical personhood. However, if the personhood designation
is necessary to protect a particular right of previously recognized natural
persons, then the rights of the newly recognized juridical person should
be limited to those actually necessary to protect the threatened right, and
should not infringe upon other rights to the extent possible.
Determining whether natural or juridical personhood is appropriate
based on concerns about undermining the rights of currently recognized
persons will not be simple." One needs to evaluate whether the entity in
question is sufficiently similar to currently recognized natural persons.
The earlier discussion of anencephalic infants provides one of the few
examples where the entity is almost identical to currently recognized
natural persons (e.g., normal infants who have interests and thus a claim
to natural personhood protections), but is granted the natural
personhood designation due not to its own interests, but based upon
concern about protecting the interests of others. As noted previously, to
argue that the interests of other natural persons cannot be sufficiently
protected except by recognizing the new entity as a natural person itself
cannot avoid a limitation of the rights of the currently recognized natural
persons, because now these newly recognized natural persons will have
equal rights. Rarely should this be the case, and anencephalic infants
may be the only example.8 In most other situations, recognition of lesser
legal status (e.g., juridical personhood) and fewer legal rights will suffice.
The following section considers the implications of this personhood
framework.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
I turn now to the application of the above analysis to two general
"categories" of entities that have raised personhood questions:
genetically human entities before birth and non-human entities such as
animals or machines with artificial intelligence. The following
subsections address the questions of legal personhood status for each
entity in turn, primarily developing the concepts with respect to
84. See Mark Sagoff, Extracorporeal Embryos and Three Conceptions of the Human, AM. J.
BioETHics, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 52, 54 (2005) (stating that, with respect to extracorporeal embryos, "[tlo
determine ... moral status ... society cannot consult biological landmarks but must debate what is
ethically permissible and culturally appropriate in view of the practical consequences and expressive
properties of our decisions" and that "[flrom a Kantian perspective we may help secure our own
humanity by treating embryos with great respect").
85. And perhaps this is a reason to think that the legal treatment of anencephalic infants is
incorrect and they should not be regarded as natural persons. Evaluation of this claim is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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embryos 86 and fetuses, but also including some initial thoughts about the
implications for non-human entities.
A. GENETICALLY HUMAN ENTITIES PRIOR TO BIRTH: EMBRYOS AND
FETUSES
The logical place to begin is with the question of whether embryos
are natural persons. If the answer is yes, it follows that all later
developed stages (e.g., fetus) would also be natural persons. If the
answer is no, then we must determine whether embryos/fetuses should
be designated juridical persons, and at what stage of development the
entity in question should be considered to be a "natural person," and
thus entitled to the full panoply of legal rights.
Currently, natural personhood designations are limited to human
beings after birth8s So the question for embryos is really a question of
whether that designation (and all the rights that accompany it) should
apply at some earlier stage of development prior to birth. If the answer
to that is no, then we might consider whether the embryo should be given
rights as juridical persons, and at what stage of development these rights
should apply. Both inquiries begin with evaluation of the interests of the
entities in question, and then move to evaluation of the interests of
others in providing protections.
86. A handful of commentators have struggled to define the legal status of embryos. See, e.g.,
Andrews, supra note 13, at 357-58; Ducor, supra note 12, at 203-06; see Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical
Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703
(1999); see John Robertson, Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Rights: In the Beginning: The
Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (990).
87. See Roe v. Wade, 41o U.S. 113, 163 (973) (holding that the state's interest in protecting the
fetus becomes compelling at viability). There have been a few recent cases challenging the status of
embryos or fetuses as persons under different areas of law. Although most of these address the actions
of pregnant women, a few do not. For example, in one case a judge dismissed a suit filed against a stem
cell research lab which tried to claim embryos were persons. See California Judge Dismisses Lawsuit
Against CIRM, BNA MED. REs. LAW & POL'Y REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2005, at 22. In another case a judge
rejected a claim that a pregnant woman and her fetus constitute two persons for purposes of driving in
an HOV lane. See NPR: Judge: Fetus Doesn't Count in HOV Lane (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 12,
20o6), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5151368. There are also some
IVF cases that claim embryos are persons, although these claims have generally been rejected. See,
e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that three day old
pre-embryos are not persons under wrongful death statute).
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i. Embryos88
Unlike later developed fetuses or even some non-human animals,
embryos exhibit none of the relevant criteria for having interests89 such as
a brain or neural system (embryos are a mass of largely undifferentiated
cells), sentience, consciousness, pain and pleasure perception, capacity to
relate to others, or ability to communicate. However, embryos are
genetically human and do have the potential to develop these various
capacities.' As one author puts it, embryos are not yet human beings, but
are "human becomings."9' Is genetic humanness and potentiality
sufficient for according embryos the rights and privileges of either
natural or juridical personhood? The biggest problem with using genetic
humanness and potentiality as a standard is its broad implications. 9 The
advent of cloning technology means that any cell in the human body that
contains a full complement of DNA has the potential to develop into an
entity with interests, and eventually a person. These clones would
88. Although the term "embryo" is the most commonly used label, the appropriate scientific term
for the fertilized egg at the earliest stage of development is "blastocyst." A blastocyst is a multi-celled
organism (a group of cells around a fluid filled cavity) that forms four days after fertilization.
Fertilization is the event that begins with the sperm entering the egg and concludes when the genetic
material is combined to form the zygote (e.g., the single-celled organism immediately after the egg and
sperm have joined). All so-called "frozen embryos" are in fact frozen blastocysts. The cells of a
blastocyst are undifferentiated; they are able to form into any of the cells in the body, and each one of
the cells can be separated from the unit and divide to form another blastocyst. This process, called
"twinning," would result in two (or more) genetically identical individuals. "Embryo" is the term given
to the entity at approximately two weeks after fertilization, which coincides with the formation of the
primitive streak (the structure which will eventually develop into the neural system). Occasionally the
term "pre-embryo" is used to refer to the developing entity during the two-week stage prior to the
formation of the primitive streak. Despite the scientific definitions, the common usage of the term
embryo has been extended to cover the many frozen blastocysts currently in storage, as well as those
at almost all stages of development following fertilization. For simplicity, this Article refers to all of
the entities in question prior to the fetal stage as embryos. A "fetus" is the label given to the entity
from eight weeks after fertilization until birth, at which point it is referred to as an "infant," "baby," or
"neonate." I do not believe that the use of the terms (or of proposed different terms) necessarily alters
the debate. Certainly there are misleading terms, e.g., "developing baby," which imply that the entity
in question is closer in attributes to a child than to original gametes (i.e., sperm and egg). But it does
not appear to make much of a difference in people's analysis whether the entity is called a blastocyst, a
pre-embryo, or an embryo.
89. See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, The Morality of Killing Human Embryos, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
26, 26-34 (2oo6) (describing why embryos do not have interests and the implications for moral status).
9o.Extracorporeal embryos may be significantly different from in utero embryos in their
potential since, as the science currently stands, they will not fully develop unless implanted. See
STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 200.
91. Becker, supra note 43, at 337 ("Human fetal development is a process analogous to
metamorphosis and just as it makes good sense to speak of butterfly eggs, larvae, and pupae as distinct
from the butterflies they become (to say that they are not butterflies) so too it makes sense to say that
human eggs, embryos, and fetuses are distinct from the humans they become-that they are not
human beings, only human becomings.").
92. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 59-68, 199-20o (describing the logical problems with arguments
that the potential to become an entity with moral status is sufficient to grant current moral status); see
also Robertson, supra note 86, at 442.
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arguably be legal and moral persons in their own right. If potential to
become a full moral person is the basis for legal personhood, then every
human skin cell, for example, would have a claim for personhood status.93
Potentiality is thus far too broad a basis for according personhood. Even
the more specific characterization of "potential to develop into a unique
individual" would not be a useful standard. Cloned individuals would be
unique individuals, because of differences in environmental factors.'
Genetically identical twins are considered unique individuals, despite
their shared genetic code. Moreover, embryos are not necessarily
genetically unique since twinning is still possible. Therefore, potentiality
alone should not be the basis for according legal status.95
Since embryos themselves do not have interests and the potential to
develop those interests is not sufficient, the only basis for legal
personhood would be the interests of other currently recognized persons.
Perhaps embryos should be designated as juridical persons because of
the need to identify a legal actor? It is difficult to understand why this
would be the case. Embryos have no interests (as defined by Feinberg
and Steinbock) 96 of their own that need protecting and there is no
evidence that the interests of other persons suffer if embryos are not
recognized as persons. To the contrary, recognition of embryos as
persons may limit, and thus undermine, the rights of currently recognized
persons.
Moreover, evaluation of whether embryos are the type of entity that
should be covered by legal personhood protections leads to the same
conclusion. Embryos share one characteristic with natural persons-they
are genetically human, and clearly the U.S. Constitution is designed to
deal with human entities. Nonetheless, despite the fact that embryos
have the potential to share all characteristics with adult competent
93. Insoo Hyun and Kyu Won Jung distinguish between biological and circumstantial potential.
See Insoo Hyun & Kyu Won Jung, Human Research Cloning, Embryos, and Embryo-Like Artifacts, 36
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5, 34 (2oo6). The first is "potentiality in the biological, quasi-Aristotelian
sense of an entity's gradually actualizing its preexisting potential." Id. at 39. Circumstantial potential,
by contrast, depends on circumstance and choice. Hyun gives the example of a medical student's
potential to become a physician. Id. Extracorporeal embryos may have biological potential (not all of
them may be viable), but not necessarily circumstantial potential since they may never be implanted.
Id.
94. Despite popular belief, clones would be unique individuals. Environment plays a significant
role in development of identity. Thus, at most one could assure that the clone would be genetically
identical, as are identical twins, but s/he would not be the same person. Even more complicating, some
cells taken from an adult will have mutated, so each of those cells would in fact be unique, again
creating a too inclusive standard for personhood.
95. See also David DeGrazia, Moral Status, Human Identity, and Early Embryos: A Critique of the
President's Approach, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 49, 53 (2oo6) (arguing that embryos are "precursor"
organisms, not potential humans).
96. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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human beings,7 they remain easily distinguishable from the entities that
are covered. Their exclusion from the protections normally afforded
to"persons" would not do damage to the concept itself by creating
arbitrary distinctions because embryos are vastly different from other
protected persons both in terms of capacity and form. Embryos share no
characteristics with infants, children, or adult competent human beings
except genetics. The characteristic of shared genetics, however, is not
sufficient by itself, since the resulting grouping would be both too broad
(it would include every human cell) and too narrow (it would exclude a
number of creatures who have significant interests, such as non-human
animals). Nor do embryos share any characteristics except genetics with
any other entities which are considered persons. Moreover, we exclude a
variety of entities that share genetic characteristics with currently
recognized natural persons from legal personhood protections. For
example, cells and tissues from the human body are not considered
persons, despite their genetic make-up. And sentient non-human animals
that share over 98% of their genetic code with humans are not
considered persons. 9 In fact, granting embryos legal rights may do
damage to the underlying precepts by limiting the rights of those who
more clearly fit the framework.
In sum, there are neither interests of embryos, nor interests of
currently recognized persons, that would justify granting legal
personhood protections to embryos. Debates about embryo disposition
should thus be primarily addressed through the application of property
theory, as I have discussed elsewhere.99 Embryos should not be afforded
97. In this respect embryos are unlike corporations or other entities that have fixed
characteristics.
98. John Nobel Wilford, Almost Human and Sometimes Smarter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. I7, 2007, at Fi
("[J]ust a 1.23 percent difference in their genes separates Homo sapiens from chimpanzees ....").
99. See Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and
Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. i59, 162 (2005). My argument starts from the novel position that
recognizing property interests in an entity does not preclude their recognition as persons. Thus,
something might have legal personhood status and also be subject to property interests of other
persons. At least one author has suggested that corporations are also both "persons" and "things." See
Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. CoMP. L. 583, 585 (5999). I argue that property rights
are the appropriate basis for legal analysis of embryo disposition, asserting that property theory
provides a conceptually better fit than the competing procreative liberty framework. See Berg, supra,
at 163. Not only is the property framework conceptually accurate, it is normatively compelling;
application of utilitarian, labor, and personality theories of property leads to the conclusion that
individuals (specifically progenitors) can have property interests in embryos, fetuses, and even
children. Id. Finally, property law provides both a descriptively accurate explanation of courts'
decisions in embryo cases and also allows judges to draw on an existing framework of law to resolve
disputes. Id. These arguments are developed and explored in my previous article. Id. For the current
Article, the important point is that individuals have property interests in their offspring that must be
considered in evaluating legal rights, and these property interests do not disappear upon the
development of the entity's personhood interests. Id.
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rights, the exercise of which would infringe on the rights of currently
recognized natural persons. Thus while a state may choose to designate
an embryo as a juridical person for certain, very limited, purposes, there
is no compelling legal rationale for doing so, and thus no rights that must
follow. Despite states' theoretical ability to do so, thus far only Louisiana
has chosen to designate embryos "juridical persons.""° Furthermore,
there may be significant limitations to what rights can be granted an
embryo, as recognition of embryo rights will necessarily infringe upon
the rights of natural persons. In some situations the infringement may be
unconstitutional. As the embryo develops, however, it will develop
interests, and those may form the basis for juridical or (eventually)
natural personhood status.
2. Fetuses
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that a fetus is not a
"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' °I
The resulting furor over the case, and subsequent three decades of
jurisprudence, plunged this country into a battle for which the lines seem
to be clearly and irrevocably drawn. At the base of these debates is the
question of fetal personhood. Contrary to popular belief, the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Roe did not forestall all state determinations
of legal personhood.' °2 Moreover, even if Roe is overturned, as some
believe to be possible given changes in the composition of the Supreme
Court, there will still be significant questions left unresolved about the
legal status of fetuses and embryos. In other words, not only is the legal
status of embryos and fetuses an open question under the current law of
Roe v. Wade, but it will remain an open question even if the case is
overruled. At the very least, if Roe is overruled, the Court is highly likely
to allow the states to determine for themselves whether to accord fetuses
legal status, rather than decide legal status itself as a matter of federal
constitutional law.
If embryos should not be considered either natural or juridical
persons, while infants once born are natural persons, there are two
remaining issues for fetuses. The first question is at what point should the
fetus be considered a natural person-should the relevant legal line
remain at birth or be earlier? The second question is whether prior to the
recognition of natural personhood, the fetus should be designated a
juridical person with some, but not all, of the rights of natural persons.
The previous section explored the limits of potentiality arguments, and
ioo. For a description of Louisiana law and the development of the statute, see Jeanne Louise
Carriere, From Status to Person In Book i, Title i of the Civil Code, 73 TuL. L. REV. 1263, 1263-86
(t999). Other states, however, have attempted to define when life begins for purposes of feticide or
child abuse statutes. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.oi(I)(bg)(2), 48.02(I)(a) (1998).
IoI. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1972).
102. See, e.g., Robert Destro, Is Roe v. Wade Obsolete?, 24 HUM. L. REV 55, 61 (1998).
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they will not be repeated here. To the extent that the argument for
recognizing legal personhood for fetuses rests on their potential to
develop interests or to become a natural person at some future time, it
fails for the reasons stated above.
Since the focus of this paper is on legal, not moral status, the
evaluation of fetal interests is constrained. Legal and moral evaluations
are intertwined, but not necessarily equivalent. As stated previously,
moral status, or the lack of it, does not determine legal personhood
status. An entity may lack moral status, but still be considered a legal
person. Conversely, an entity may have moral status but not be
considered a legal person. In such a case, the lack of legal recognition
would not negate the entity's moral status, and the absence of legal
obligations would not imply the absence of moral obligations.
The concern is not with determining at what point the fetus develops
any interests, but at what point those interests should form the basis of
legal personhood. This is a question of line drawing-legal personhood
must come into play at some point in time even though fetal interests
likely develop along a continuum. The law is a rather blunt instrument.
Although there may be a way to achieve a somewhat nuanced legal
approach by recognizing juridical personhood at an early stage of fetal
development, and subsequently natural personhood at a later stage, both
designations still must be based on fairly easily identifiable standards-in
other words, we must still draw lines. The final determination of whether
and how to draw distinctions between different developmental levels of
human beings may depend on practical needs in identifying clear legal
lines. If this is the case, then the lack of legal personhood recognition will
not negate the moral claims of the entity in question. The entity may still
have certain moral rights, and others will have moral obligations to
respect those rights.
There are a number of possible biological events that can be used to
determine legal status, each having significance in different ways. I will
not go through all the potential biological landmarks in the subsections
that follow. Rather, this section considers the legal significance of, and
interplay between, three important factors in fetal development:
sentience (consciousness), birth, and physical development. I choose not
to focus on viability since it is a changing line (as technology improves,
viability will push back towards conception), as well as an incredibly
imprecise standard-does the standard mean viable for a minute, an
hour, a day, a week, a month, or longer?
a. Sentience
Prior to the development of sentience, which occurs in the latter part
of the second trimester, the fetus does not have interests of its own and
thus does not have the requisite basis for natural personhood. Sentience,
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or conscious awareness, is necessary to feel-for example, fetuses cannot
perceive pain prior to sentience (and thus have no interest in avoiding
pain).'" Sentience cannot occur until the neural system is sufficiently
developed to allow for brain functioning and consciousness, at around
twenty-two to twenty-four weeks." While this currently provides a rough
match with the present standards for viability, unlike viability the
timeline will not change as medical technology advances. Eventually
artificial womb technology may suffice to keep the ex utero fetus alive
from the embryonic stage, and allow development to continue. But prior
to sentience the fetus will not have interests, regardless of its location in
or outside the body. This is not to say that artificial womb technology
should not be used prior to sentience, but merely that its use cannot be
based on regard for the fetus's own interests, but must refer to the
interests of others.
I have pointed out previously that natural personhood is rarely, if
ever, granted merely on the basis of the interests of others. It is hard to
understand how the interests of currently recognized people would suffer
if we do not include non-sentient fetuses on an equal legal footing.
Fetuses are not currently recognized as natural persons, and there is little
or no evidence that the legal rights and interests of currently recognized
persons have suffered. An argument to recognize fetuses as natural
persons should bear the burden of showing that the interests of others
are harmed, or else it must rest on the interests of the fetus itself. As
noted above, prior to sentience fetuses lack interests of their own, under
the Feinberg/Steinbock approach, thus juridical personhood prior to
sentience would be inappropriate. Arguably, the Supreme Court
jurisprudence recognizing increasing state interests after viability (which
maps roughly onto sentience) is compatible with the notion that prior to
sentience the interests at stake (those of others, not the fetus) are too
weak to provide significant legal protections for the fetus itself. Others
are certainly free to reject the Feinberg/Steinbock concept of interests,
and attempt to develop a different theory of interests that would apply to
fetuses. My point is that if fetuses are to be considered natural persons
because of their interests, an argument must be made that they have
interests, using a coherent understanding of the term that can be applied
across different entities. If fetuses are to be considered natural persons
because of the interests of others, there must be some argument about
how the interests of others are harmed by the exclusion of fetuses in the
category of natural persons. All of this is not to say that fetuses are not
103. Pain perception may occur even later than the onset of sentience. See, e.g., Susan J. Lee et al.,
Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. A.M.A. 947, 952 (2005)
(concluding that given the timeline for neural development, it is extremely unlikely that a fetus
perceives pain before twenty-seven to thirty weeks gestation).
104. STEINBOcK, supra note 33, at 84-85.
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entitled to legal protection, or that juridical personhood is not a
possibility, merely that natural personhood prior to sentience is not
warranted.
But what happens after sentience? At this point fetuses have claims
based on their own interests. What would be the effect of granting
natural personhood status to fetuses when they reach the point of
sentience? Significantly greater restrictions on abortion would result as
states would have an obligation to protect fetuses, just as they now do to
protect already-born children. Moreover, designating fetuses as natural
persons prior to birth would limit the rights of other currently recognized
natural persons-particularly pregnant women whose decisions during
pregnancy might be constrained in the same way that parents' decisions
are constrained by the interests of their already born children. Fetal
interests at the point of sentience are not strong enough to justify these
limitations. Arguably newborn interests at the point of birth are not
sufficient either. Rather, the natural person designation at birth is based
on protection of the interests of others. However, during the prenatal
period, the interests of others are not strong enough to justify granting
fetuses full natural personhood status or protections while still in utero
based solely on sentience-other factors must also be present. Those
who disagree with this position should have the burden of showing that
limiting the rights of others (by designating fetuses as natural persons)
would be necessary in order to fully protect the rights of currently
recognized people.
Would it be appropriate to consider a sentient in utero fetus a
juridical person with certain legal protections prior to birth? The answer
here is likely yes. It would be a matter of state choice (as are other
juridical personhood designations). Those states that choose to afford
sentient fetuses juridical personhood status would need to align the rights
given to the interests at stake. The fact that sentience is not possible prior
to twenty-two and twenty-four weeks gestation does not mean that the
fetus has fully developed cognition and perception. At this point, for
example, the fetus may not be able to feel pain, and thus has no interest
in avoiding pain. 5 If this is so, a state should not be able to require fetal
anesthetic use during all abortions at twenty-two weeks based on
sentience.' °6 Legislation providing specific protections prior to birth, but
105. See Lee, supra note 103, at 952. A few letters written in response to the article questioned the
twenty-seven-week cut-off point, but even these individuals did not question the lack of pain
perception before sometime late in the second trimester. See Laura Myers et al., Bobbi Lyman, Brian
Sites, Letters to the Editor, 295 J. A.M.A. 159, 159-6o (2oo6).
Io6. Perhaps there are other interests that might justify such a requirement, although it is a more
difficult argument to make. For example, requiring that women be informed after twenty-two weeks,
that abortions may cause fetal pain may be based on the state's interests in preserving fetal life
(assuming that some women will choose not to undergo the procedure if told the misleading
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after sentience, is an area which states might explore in more detail.
b. Cognitive and Physical Development
The closer to birth, the greater the interests of the fetus, and the
greater the interests of others in providing the same kinds of protections
as are granted to currently recognized persons such as children. If we
give newborn infants legal protections based on these interests, why not
fully developed fetuses? It is hard to understand why an entity at this
stage should not be considered as having equal legal status as an entity
outside the womb. But one problem with a "development" standard is
that it does not take into account fetuses that have problems in
development. As a result, we might set the standard based on gestational
age, rather than "full development."
At the end of the eighth month of pregnancy (thirty-two weeks), in
most cases, all of the fetus's internal and external organ structures have
substantially developed.'" Natural personhood and thus constitutional
protections could apply at this late stage of development. The result
would change in the analysis of both abortions and forced caesarian-
sections after this time point-the rights of the pregnant woman would
be balanced against the rights of a "fetal natural person." I will discuss
this in more detail in the following section. While it may be tempting to
change the timeline for according natural personhood, there are reasons
to be wary. First, fetal age determinations can be inexact.'° Second, even
in the absence of natural personhood protections prior to birth, the fetus
is entitled to significant moral status-status which may be recognized
under a juridical personhood framework. Pregnancy terminations at this
point are highly restricted; except in cases of severe fetal abnormality,
they are almost always undertaken with the goal of achieving a live birth
(e.g., ending the pregnancy, but not the life of the fetus). In cases of
severe fetal abnormality, the issues raised are similar to those raised by
neonatal euthanasia."° The only difference is the added complication of
the pregnant woman's right of bodily integrity, which plays a significant
role in the analysis and does not change if the fetus is considered a
natural person. As a result, it may not be necessary to consider the fetus
a natural person prior to birth to achieve fetal protections, and may
significantly complicate the situation to do so.
information).
107. Additionally, at this point infant mortality rates decrease as compared to preterm births
before thirty-two weeks. See Michael Kramer et al., The Contribution of Mild and Moderate Preterm
Birth to Infant Mortality, 284 J. A.M.A. 843, 844 (2000).
io8. See Michael S. Kramer et al., The Validity of Gestational Age Estimation by Menstrual Dating
in Term, Preterm, and Postterm Gestations, 260 J. A.M.A. 3306,3307 (1988).
1o9. This is not to say that the neonatal euthanasia is simple, but that the situations should be
considered comparable. See Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 151, 175-76 (1988) (discussing neonatal euthanasia).
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Juridical personhood based on developmental or gestational age
may be appropriate. This is already done implicitly by states which
accord fetuses limited rights prior to birth by recognizing a variety of
causes of action for harm done to fetuses at different stages of
development. Alternatively, gestational age might serve as a bright line
cut-off for sentience. Thus a state might explicitly grant juridical
personhood protections at twenty-two weeks gestation, on the
assumption that for a normally developing fetus that point marks the
earliest time at which sentience is possible. For fetuses which are not
experiencing normal development, the presumption of personhood could
be rebutted-much as is done currently in determining viability or lack
thereof.
c. Birth
There are practical reasons for choosing birth as the latest point at
which personhood protections adhere, and thus at which the label
"natural person" must be applied. Likewise, a fetus born prematurely,
but after sentience, should also be considered a natural person and
treated as a full-term newborn would be treated under the law. Except in
the absence of brain material or brain activity, it is practically impossible
to determine sentience using current medical technology, and treatment
decisions for premature neonates are based on rough approximations of
development, rather than evaluations of sentience. But what about a
fetus "born""' clearly prior to sentience,"' as might be the case if
artificial womb technology advances?"'
The answer depends on whether there are interests of others in
according legal personhood protections, as is the case with anencephalic
infants."3 Unlike anencephalic infants, however, these entities may not
iio. In fact, it may become possible to fertilize and develop a fetus completely outside the womb.
See generally ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION
(Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook eds., 2006) (discussing ectogenesis).
I I i. There are also fetuses born prior to viability, which live for a brief period of time. In one case
the court determined that the lack of viability meant the fetuses could not be considered "persons"
under the Ohio wrongful death statute. See Griffiths v. The Rose Ctr., No. 2005CA00256, 2006 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1474, at *to (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 20o6).
112. Also of interest would be cases of fetal surgery where the fetus is either partially or fully
removed from the womb temporarily or the uterus is removed from the woman temporarily. See
generally Maggie Jones, A Miracle, and Yet, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 15, 2001, at 40-43.
113. Becker identifies the eighth month of development as the time of "metamorphosis." Becker,
supra note 43, at 345. He goes so far as to suggest that a fetus born before metamorphosis is complete,
such as an extremely premature infant, should be regarded as the birth of a human becoming. Id. at
345-48. But cf. Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 454 (Okla. 1999) (conceding that there may be a
distinction between biological existence and personhood, but rejecting the idea that the distinction
extends beyond live birth). There are also issues of when to withdraw legal status protections from a
human being that no longer meets the moral status requirements. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Other
Right-to-Life Debate: When Does Fourteenth Amendment "Life" End?, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1183, 1I88
(1995) ("When history and constitutional text yield ambiguities rather than answers, constitutional
interpretation should be guided by the moral and economic consequences that might follow from
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share any form with later developed humans. Would an eight-week old
fetus be considered a legal person if in an artificial womb? The interests
of others do not seem strong enough to accord natural personhood
protections in this case. But this may be a situation in which juridical
personhood protections are appropriate. A living but pre-sentient fetus
outside the mother's body (in an artificial womb) creates an unusual
situation. In utero fetuses have the ancillary protections of their mother's
legal personhood. But ex utero fetuses would not have these protections.
While parental property interests would function and may provide a
basis for decision making and control (as they do in the ex utero embryo
context),"' we may well need the additional identification of the
developing ex utero fetus as a separate legal actor. As artificial womb
technology advances, this question should receive more thought and
analysis.
d. Summary: Juridical to Natural Persons
Thus far I have argued that sentience is crucial for the development
of fetal interests, and birth and external form each play a role in
considering the interests of others. The same constraints that limit the
scope of juridical personhood rights for embryos function in the pre-
consciousness context for fetuses. Granting juridical personhood status
to fetuses prior to sentience may undermine the rights of currently
recognized persons-for example pregnant women's rights to make a
variety of decisions in the first trimester would be limited. Even apart
from abortion decisions, if we grant fetuses such status, women may have
constraints placed upon their decisions to engage in risky activities, or to
partake of legal substances that are harmful to the fetus. In order to
justify this, proponents would need to show that the legal recognition was
necessary in order to safeguard rights of currently recognized natural
persons, and that the result would be a greater protection of the rights of
natural persons overall. This is an extremely difficult argument to make,
and may fail in many situations. Arguments that the lack of legal
recognition of fetal rights prior to sentience harms the rights of people
generally, ignores the harm to the rights of people resulting from the
recognition itself. Thus prior to sentience the fetus should be considered
neither a natural, nor a juridical person. There may be restrictions on
what can be done with fetuses born extremely early, either because of an
interrupted pregnancy, or because they were never implanted after in
vitro fertilization, but these limitations are not based on the personhood
status of the fetus. The interests of others can function to limit many
actions, without resulting in personhood status for the entity in question.
Consider, for example, legal restrictions related to actions involving
equally plausible alternative meanings.").
114. See Berg, supra note 99, at 214.
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endangered species."5 We may not be allowed to destroy the habitat of a
particular type of frog, regardless of whether that frog can make any
claim to personhood. The protections are based on the interests of others
in maintaining the diversity of species on this planet, not necessarily on
the interests of the species itself. Likewise, there may be a variety of
restrictions on what can be done to a pre-sentient fetus based on the
interests of currently recognized persons.
Birth, after sentience, is sufficient for natural personhood status-
not because the interests of the fetus are any greater with the birth, but
because the interests of others in affording full natural personhood
protections are strong enough to grant natural personhood. This is true
regardless of the physical development of the child. Birth without
sentience due to developmental problems, but at the point of
significantly complete physical development, also provides a basis for
natural personhood, again based on the interests of others. Substantially
full physical development (eighth month of pregnancy or later)
combined with sentience may be sufficient to accord the fetus the
protections of natural persons, but careful consideration should be given
to the practical effect of such designation.
In the period of time between sentience and natural personhood,
there may be reasons to provide fetuses the status and protections of
juridical persons. Sentience does not mean that the fetus attains equal
status with adult competent human beings,"' merely that the fetus has
characteristics that can form the basis for personhood protections based
on its own (rather than other's) interests. Moreover, as the fetus
develops closer to a newborn infant, both its interests and the interests of
others that form the basis for juridical personhood protections may
increase."7 The following section discusses some initial implications of
this proposed framework.
e. Implications
My goal here is not to provide a full analysis, nor even a complete
summary of the relevant issues, but rather to begin to refocus, in light of
my proposed framework, the debate in some of the most highly
contentious areas of law such as abortion and medical interventions on
behalf of a fetus. Paradoxically, perhaps, the framework I suggest should
115. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1339-40. Sunstein, however, would argue in favor of legal
standing for animals. Id. at 1336.
116. STEINBOCK, supra note 33, at 24 ("[The interest view] ... does not locate beings on a scale of
moral importance. In particular, it is silent as to whether all beings who have moral status have it
equally. Perhaps such features as species membership, rationality, and potentiality are relevant to
moral status, providing principled reasons for counting the interests of some beings more heavily than
others.").
II7. See STRONG, supra note 5t, at 41-62 (suggesting that moral status increases along with fetal
development).
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not result in drastic changes in current laws. This is one of the strengths
of the proposal, as it should not result in great legal upheaval. The most
significant change should be in how the cases are analyzed, and the basis
for evaluating future cases that do not fit well under the current model
(such as fetuses in artificial womb environments). The shift in focus
should clarify the issues that need further evaluation, and move us away
from the simplistic, and misguided, assertion that Roe's determination
about whether the fetus is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment is
the only relevant question.
To begin, I want to make two, interrelated, points. The first is that
fetuses are considered persons already under the laws of many states."'
The second is that this recognition should be explicit and fetuses should
be labeled juridical persons for purposes of the application of these
rights. The status designation serves a number of purposes. It emphasizes
that the rights in question are rights of persons, but those of a juridical
person, not a natural person. To some extent this clarifies the apparent
inconsistency between laws allowing abortions, for example, and laws
allowing tort suits for pre-birth injuries. It is not that fetuses are
considered persons for some laws and not for others, but that they are
considered juridical persons with specific, but not complete, rights.
Finally, explicit recognition allows states to identify specifically the rights
in question that go with the status, rather than simply assert that the fetus
is a "person" (without limitation) for some purposes and not a person for
others. This should result both in more detailed policy discussions about
allowing fetuses certain "personhood" rights, understanding that the
recognition of the rights limits the rights of existing natural persons, and
also more attention paid to why we grant certain juridical personhood
rights to various entities, and whether those should be limited or even
extended. As a result, we may choose to provide personhood protections
for sentient fetuses without granting them the same rights as fully
recognized natural persons. Juridical personhood is not a unitary
concept; there are different kinds of juridical persons and different rights
which may adhere. To the extent that states have discretion in
determining which entities will be considered juridical persons, they may
make different choices about the types of rights which they grant sentient
fetuses. This has already proved to be the case, as demonstrated by the
vast array of prenatal laws currently in place.
There is little in the above analysis that should change abortion laws
which apply prior to twenty-two to twenty-four weeks, that is, prior to
the development of sentience, other than to reinforce that the restrictions
before this time period cannot be based on fetal interests."9 The above
118. See, e.g., sources cited supra note too.
I 19. Most of the statutory restrictions are based on state interests in potential fetal life, not directly
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framework may, however, have some implications both for evaluations
of abortion restrictions post-viability and for prenatal and medical care
decisions made by a pregnant woman towards the very end of the
pregnancy. The current "undue burden" test articulated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'20 and reaffirmed by
Stenberg v. Carhart'2' is based on balancing the interests of the woman
making the abortion decision against the interests of the state. Certainly
this balance would still be a factor even if the fetus is granted additional
legal rights. That is, the state would still have interests which may need to
be balanced against the individual's interests.
Designating fetuses as legal persons, however, would create a
situation in which the fetus's interests would have to be taken into
account on their own (not simply indirectly as is now done through the
state's interests in protecting potential life). Thus the analysis would look
more like the analysis that takes place in the context of parental
decisions regarding minor's medical care-specifically, refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment. Others have pointed out that the language
of "rights" is less helpful in the parental decision-making context, since
"parental rights" do not rest on any clear constitutional basis.'22 In
contrast, the abortion situation does involve constitutional rights of
bodily integrity.'23 Weighing the rights of one natural person against
another natural person is difficult. To the extent a fetus is considered a
natural person, the abortion debate will have to consider how to weigh
the woman's right of bodily integrity against the fetal right to life.
Although a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, we can
draw some initial conclusions. Since there are no laws requiring parents
to sacrifice their lives for their children, it would be hard to imagine that
we would accept a legal requirement to do so in the context of
pregnancy. Thus between the woman's right to life and the fetus's right
to life, the woman's legal rights should be given preference. Harder, of
course, is the balance between the woman's right to health, and the
fetus's right to health or even life. The varying opinions either allowing
or disallowing forced c-sections for almost full-term pregnancies is
evidence of the difficulty courts have weighing these issues.' 4 The
framework I have suggested here should encourage a shift in thinking
about these issues to focus on the parallel between this situation and
on fetal interests. The two may be the same or may entail a slightly different focus. Analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
120. 505 U.S. 833,874-79 (1992).
121. 530 U.S. 914,938-46 (2ooo).
122. Schneider, supra note lo9, at 157-161.
123. Of course the question will be how extensive that right is and what it entails.
124. See, e.g., Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1192, 1192-96 (1987).
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others that involve direct conflicts between the health/life of one person
and the health/life of another. Moreover, it should lead to greater
evaluation of the concept and extent of so-termed "bodily integrity"
rights.'25
My proposal should have three significant advantages over the
current mode of analysis. First, it will allow states to "experiment" in
finding the best system of recognizing and balancing legal rights in cases
involving embryos and fetuses. Since legal personhood should no longer
be viewed as a closed question, states should be free to consider how best
to accord juridical personhood status. Second, it should allow us to find
better and conceptually more appealing answers to new debates in
reproductive law. This will be extremely important as reproductive
technology advances and the legal cases continue to move away from the
traditional abortion context. Finally, it may achieve a compromise
position in an area that has thus far been marked by heated and divisive
commentaries.
B. NON-HUMAN ANIMALS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Although I have focused primarily on embryos and fetuses thus far,
the framework suggested here may be applicable to other entities. The
idea that we might exclude from legal status an entity that meets all the
attribute requirements for equal moral status with currently recognized
persons, but that is not genetically human, raises the question of why
genetic humanness matters.2' It seems inconsistent to argue for the
extension of legal protection to a non-sentient multi-celled human
organism in the beginning stages of development (i.e., an embryo) and
withhold such protections from fully developed sentient, and perhaps
even rational, non-human animals.'" If genetics is the sole basis for legal
personhood, there must be some explanation as to why this characteristic
is so important.28 Thus far no one has provided a satisfactory argument
125. Given the post-viability time period, abortions would not be permissible in most states except
to save the mother's life/health, or, in a few states, because of severe fetal abnormalities. The former
case involves a balancing of mother's interests against fetal interests. The latter case may rest on a
determination that the fetus in question does not have interests or has lesser interests because of the
abnormalities. This determination may be more controversial since it rests on the assumption that we
can evaluate sentience/interests based on disability. I have suggested that this is extremely difficult in
most cases but perhaps not impossible. See Schneider, supra note To9, at 170 (discussing the
conservative dislike of attempts to distinguish between people based on worth).
126. See generally PAOLA CAVALIERI, THE ANIMAL QUESTION: WHY NONHUMAN ANIMALS DESERVE
HUMAN RIGHTS 3-12 (Catherine Woollard trans., 2001); ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS].
127. Bernard Rollin takes this a step further and points out that if the potential to become rational
is sufficient reason to grant non-rational humans moral status, animals should also be afforded moral
status because they have the potential to evolve into rational beings. See BERNARD ROLLIN, ANIMAL
RIGHTS AND HUMAN MORALITY 33-34,50 (rev. ed. 1992).
128. See L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 32-33 (1981) (discussing moral personhood
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in this respect.'29
Apart from concerns about consistency and fairness, withholding
legal personhood protections from an entity that clearly meets all criteria
for moral personhood is not a priori improper, as long as the interests of
the entity in question are respected. The danger, of course, is that society
has tried in the past to limit the legal rights of entities that clearly met all
requirements for moral personhood-e.g., women and slaves-and the
results were highly problematic, not only because violations of moral
rights occurred, but because the exclusion of such entities from the
system of legal protection per se undermined moral rights. In other
words, at some point the moral and legal rights may be so intertwined
that it is impossible to respect moral rights without also granting legal
rights. But the situations of women and slaves may be unique in that they
are groups that are both human and meet the moral requirements for
personhood (e.g., they shared all characteristics/capacities with other
fully recognized legal persons, except sex or skin color).'30 By contrast,
restrictions on the legal status of entities that fail one or the other
attributes (e.g., non-human animals) may not prevent recognition of their
moral rights. ''
Part of the difficulty in accepting legal status based on moral claims
of non-human entities may stem from a mistaken insistence on "all-or-
nothing" designations. Categorically determining what entities lack any
moral status, such as a rock, is fairly simple. But most claims of moral
status map along a continuum. Using such an approach, many animals
would be granted moral status based on interests, but their placement on
the moral hierarchy may be lower than that of human persons."'3 Legal
and stating that a criterion of personhood "must have some plausible connection with the possession
of certain moral rights" and "[t]here must, therefore, be some reason for thinking that it is in virtue of
an entity's possessing just these properties that it has such rights, that these properties mark the crucial
watershed between entities with these rights and entities without them").
129. For example, it is common knowledge that humans and chimpanzees share over 98% of their
genetic code. See, e.g., Wilford, supra note 98. It is unlikely that the 2% genetic difference is a
sufficient basis for according legal personhood, without some consideration of other factors.
130. Of course this was part of what was at issue at the times when women and black people were
excluded from legal protections. Both were thought to be intellectually inferior to white men, and
lacking the criteria necessary to be considered of equal moral status to white men. Black people were
also sometimes referred to as "sub-human," a label which presumably was designed to imply that
black people were not even human and thus had even less claim to legal status.
131. Some advocates for animal rights accept the analogy with women and slaves and argue that
the denial of rights to "nonhumans endowed with intentionality ... does not simply deprive the victims
of the objects of their rights, but is a direct attack on those very rights themselves." CAVALIERI, supra
note 126, at 142-43. Others reject the analogy. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Animals as Objects, or
Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 126, at 143, 151. It will be interesting to consider the
future legal status of chimeras (animal-human) mixes, particularly those that are sentient. See, e.g.,
Jamie Shreeve, The Other Stem-Cell Debate, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. sO, 2005, at 42-47.
132. See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of
Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 54 (2002) (noting that some historical views generally hold
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status might follow this hierarchy. For example, some authors assert that
great apes and dolphins should be considered legal persons based on
their mental and emotional similarities to human beings. 33 Perhaps we
should develop a system of lesser legal status for non-human animals.' "
The fact that the law as it is currently written does not include non-
human animals does not mean that it could not be altered to recognize
the rights of entities with varying moral status.'35 Rather than do so by
creating new categories, I argue that is what could be done with the
concept of "juridical personhood."
There are good reasons to consider whether sentient animals should
be given juridical personhood protections. These may not be equivalent
for all sentient creatures, but, as with developing human fetuses, may
vary depending on the interests at stake.'3 6 Thus far no state has chosen
to provide any legal rights directly to animals; animal welfare laws
protect the interests of natural persons in preventing harm to animals.
This, like fetal juridical personhood, is an area ripe for state
that animals are part of the "Great Chain of Being" with humans at the top of the moral chain and
"progressively lower rungs" are inhabited by "rational beings, sentient beings," and "'creatures who
are barely alive' (quoting GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE
DOG? 112 (2OOO))). Even strong advocates of animal rights, such as Peter Singer, accept that persons
(which he defines as "sentient beings that are self-aware and capable of reason") are more valuable
than non-persons. See WARREN, supra note 33, at 69 (discussing Singer). Likewise, our society is built
on the notion that laws focus on the highest actors in the moral hierarchy, human persons, rather than
non-persons, regardless of whether the non-persons have a morally valuable life and interests such as
avoiding pain.
133. See Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, in THE GREAT APE
PROJECT 248, 248-57 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993); Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters,
From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart, II SETON HALL CONST. L.J. s, 1-68 (2000); MARY
MIDGLEY, Is a Dolphin a Person?, in UTOPIAS, DOLPHINS AND COMPUTERS: PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL
PLUMBING 107, 107-7 (1996).
134. Many animal rights advocates would accept such a system. For example, in their brief in favor
of granting personhood rights to great apes Lee Hall and Anthony Jon Waters note that their premise
is based on the fact that there are only two categories-person or property. Hall & Waters, supra note
133, at 2. Presumably they would be open to categorization of the great apes in a third category if one
were available. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997) (stating that pets occupy "'a
special place somewhere inbetween a person and a piece of property'(quoting Corso v. Crawford
Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1979))); see also David Favre, A New Property Status
for Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 126, at 234, 234-50 (describing a system of equitable self-
ownership for animals).
135. See, e.g., Linda MacDonald Glenn, Biotechnology at the Margins of Personhood: An Evolving
Legal Paradigm, 13 J. EVOLUTION & TECH. (2003), http://www.jetpress.org/volumeI3/glenn.html.
(discussing genetic engineering, transgenics and newly- or to-be-created life forms; attempting to
define each "new" or "altered" entity as a person, from historical, moral, societal, philosophical,
theological, and legal perspectives; and concluding by arguing that all life forms, including pre-
embryos, should be treated as persons or property, depending upon where they fall on a continuum of
property to persons and accorded rights commensurate with the degree of "personhood" each entity
possesses).
136. Consider, for example, whether elephants should have legal protections to avoid
psychological trauma. See Charles Siebert, An Elephant Crackup?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 8,
2006, at 42-48, 64, 71-73 (describing the possibility of post-traumatic stress disorder in elephants).
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experimentation. If animals are to be considered legal persons with
specific rights based on their own interests, the protections should reflect
and be commensurate with those interests.
It is less appropriate to grant legal status to non-human animals
based on concerns about the effect on other persons of withholding such
legal status. There is little evidence, for example, that failing to recognize
animals as juridical persons, or failing to give them particular rights,
harms the exercise of those rights for human persons. The closest
argument to this, sometimes used to justify animal welfare laws, is that
cruelty to animals is linked (or may lead to) cruelty to humans. Even if
this is true, this may not justify granting juridical personhood to animals,
but merely laws designed to prevent cruelty to animals. In such a case,
the lack of legal recognition would not negate the entity's moral status,
and the absence of legal obligations would not imply the absence of
moral obligations.'3 7 Thus we may have a moral obligation not to be cruel
to animals, whether or not we have a law against such cruelty.
Additionally, should scientists succeed in creating sentient
machines,' 38 our society will have to consider whether those machines
may also lay claim to legal personhood protections.'39 Here, both
justifications for juridical personhood function-some machines may
have interests sufficient for legal status, others may be so human-like in
form that excluding them from personhood status will harm the interests
of current humans. Like the Replicants in Philip K. Dick's novel-turned-
movie, Blade Runner,'4 ° the creation of such entities will challenge our
conventional notions of what it means to be a person, and our
recognition of what legal rights should follow. Perhaps the creation of
such entities will force greater attention to the question of legal
personhood status, since the discussion in the context of embryos and
137. Moral obligations may not preclude killing of the entity in question. See, e.g., Ronald Green,
supra note 28, at 44 (suggesting that "one can use an entity (embryo; animal) in research, and even kill
it when necessary, without necessarily failing to respect the moral claims that the entity has on us").
138. See generally John Markoff, Brainy Robots Start Stepping into Daily Life, N.Y. TIMES, July I8,
20o6, at AI.
139. See Linda MacDonald Glenn, A Legal Perspective on Humanity, Personhood, and Species
Boundaries, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 27. 27-28 (2003) (considering human-nonhuman chimeras); Richard
Lucas, Why Bother? Ethical Computers- That's Why!, in ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
PROCEEDING SERIES, VOL. 7: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN INSTrrUTE CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTER ETHICS 33-38 (John Weckert ed., 2000) (arguing that computers, and other artificial
intelligence, may be held to moral standards as persons because they possess the following
characteristics: reason, the capacity for choice, self-awareness, nurturance, co-operation, respect for all
life-forms, and moral reciprocity and that "Computer-ethics" must contain, at least, computer (not
human) versions of anonymity, duty, equality, intentionality, judgment, and responsibility); Michael D.
Rivard, Toward A General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional
Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428-1510 (1992) (considering
transgenics).
140. See BLADE RUNNER (Blade Runner Partnership 1982).
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fetuses is marred by the strong feelings underlying the protracted
abortion debate.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores and develops a model for according legal
personhood, arguing that natural personhood designations are extremely
limited and that juridical personhood designations should be explored in
greater detail. The work here is by no means complete. The implications
are not fully developed-rather I stress how this new framework might
function to shift the focus of debate.
The purpose of the work done here is to stress that "legal
personhood" is a rich and complex area of law. In the reproductive area,
arguments framed in terms of "pro-life" and "pro-choice" have thus far
been unsuccessful in moving dialogue forward. Likewise, simplistic
assertions of embryo, fetal, or non-human animal personhood, without
considering the justifications for such designations, also fail to provide
sufficient resolutions. Creative solutions are necessary. The analysis of
legal personhood proposed in this Article is an attempt to provide one
such solution. Its success will be measured, in part, by the debate it
engenders.
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